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JUS';"lCE: THURGOOD MARSHALL

J une 28, 1983

Re :

No . 82-52-Arizo na Governing Committee v. Norris

?-'.tDiORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

In response to the revision in footnote 7 of the dissent
to include Arizona Stat. Ann. 620-448, I have revised the
second and third paragraphs of footnote 17 on pages 13 and 14
o f my opinion to read as follows:
Although petitioners contended in the Court of
Appe als that their conduct was exempted from the
reach of Title VII by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1011 et seq.,
they have made no mention of the Act in either their
petition for certiorari or their brief on the merits.
"[O]nly in the most exceptional cases will we consider
issues not raised in the petition," Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 481 n. 15 (1976); see Sup. Ct. R. 2l(a),
and but for the discussion of the question in the
dissent we would have seen no reason to address a
contention that petitioners deliberately chose to
abandon after it was rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Since the dissent relies on the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, however, post, at 5-7, we think i t is appropriate
to lay the matter to rest.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act
provides that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supercede any law enacted by
any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, • • • unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance." 15 U.S.C. §1012(b).
The application of Title VII in this case does not
supercede the application of any state law regulating
"the business of insurance." As the Court of Appeals
explained, 671 F.2d, at 333, the plaintiffs in this
case have not challenged the conduct of the business
of insurance. No insurance company has been joined
~s a.defendant, and our judgment will in no way preclude
any ~nsurance company from offering annuity benefits
that are calculated on the basis of sex-segregated
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actuarial tables. All that ia at issue in this case
ia an !!plOyment practice: the practice of offering
a ..
-re employee ttie opportunity to obtain greater
moDthly annuity benefits than could be obtained by a
st.ilarly situated female employee. It is this
conduct of ~e employer that is prohibited by Title
VIZ. By its own te:rma, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
applies only to the business of insurance and has no
application to employment practices. Arizona plainly
is not itself involved in the business of insurance,
since it baa not underwritten any riaka. See Union
Pireno,
u.s.
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(1982)
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